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Abstract
Health information technologies have greatly
facilitated sharing of personal health data for
secondary use, which is critical to medical and health
research. However, there is a growing concern about
privacy due to data sharing and publishing. Medical
and health data typically contain unstructured text
documents, such as clinical narratives, pathology
reports, and discharge summaries. This study concerns
privacy-preserving extraction, summary, and release of
information from medical documents. Existing studies
on privacy-preserving data mining and publishing
focus mostly on structured data. We propose a novel
approach to enable privacy-preserving extract,
summarize, query and report patients’ demographic,
health and medical information from medical
documents. The extracted data is represented in a
semi-structured, set-valued data format, which can be
stored in a health information system for query and
analysis. The privacy preserving mechanism is based
on the cutting-edge idea of differential privacy, which
offers rigorous privacy guarantee.

1. Introduction
Medical documents and other unstructured data,
such as clinical narratives and discharge summaries,
are essential for documenting interactions between
patients and healthcare providers. These clinical and
medical texts are typically embedded in an electronic
medical records (EMR) system. They contain rich
information useful for improving clinical decision
support and for medical and healthcare research
[13][20]. Traditionally, extraction of information from
clinical text into a form suitable for analysis and
research is done manually by domain specialists. In
recent years, there have been significant developments
in using natural language processing (NLP) techniques
for information extraction from medical documents
[19][23].
In order to make patient data available for research
and analysis, it is vital to ensure that patient privacy is
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appropriately protected. To this end, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
[5][6] has established a set of privacy rules. The HIPA
Safe Harbor rule specifies 18 categories of explicitly or
potentially identifying attributes – called Protected
Health Information (PHI) – that must be removed or
altered before the health data is released to a third
party. However, a strict implementation of the Safe
Harbor rule may be inadequate for protecting privacy
or preserving data utility. Studies have shown that the
Safe Harbor rule lacks the flexibility to adequately
meet the diverse needs of data users; it can be underprotective in some cases and over-protective in others
[18][25]. Recognizing this limitation, HIPAA also
provides guidelines that enable a statistical assessment
of privacy disclosure risk in order to determine if the
data is appropriate for release. This study focuses on
this aspect of the HIPAA principle.
Along the line of the statistical approach, there is a
large body of research on privacy-preserving data
sharing and publishing, most of which focus on
structured data [1][11]. Privacy models such as kanonymity [24], l-diversity [17], t-closeness [14],
differential privacy [8][9], and clustering-based
anonymization approaches [15][16] have been
proposed to formalize privacy protection requirements.
Various methods and algorithms have been developed
to anonymize structured data to satisfy the
requirements in the aforementioned privacy models
[1][11].
In spite of this richness of research in data privacy,
its application in medical domains lags behind in some
aspects. Medical data typically contain text documents.
In such cases, identity information is embedded in the
textual contents, where anonymization techniques
designed for structured data are not readily applicable.
Thus, the majority of privacy research in sharing and
releasing information in medical documents has
followed the Safe Harbor rule directly, focusing on the
automatic detection of PHI attributes in the documents
[18][21][25]. The identified PHI values are then simply
removed from or encrypted in the released text. Studies
have shown that such simple de-identification
strategies lack the flexibility to adequately meet the
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diverse needs of data users; they can be underprotective (i.e., not satisfying privacy requirements) in
some cases and over-protective (i.e., resulting in poor
data utility) in others [18][25]. There is a lack of
research on how to provide adequate information for
identified PHI in a privacy-preserving manner (other
than simple removal) and how to cope with non-PHI
but potentially identifying information to improve
privacy protection and data utility.
In this paper, we study privacy issues related to
releasing summary and query information from patient
medical documents. We propose a novel approach to
extract and release patients’ demographic, health and
medical data from clinical text. The extracted data is
represented in a semi-structured, set-valued data
format, which is then used for privacy-preserving
query and analysis. Our privacy mechanism is
designed based on the differential privacy framework.
The main contributions of this research are: (1) We
examine a problem that has not been formally studied
in the literature, which is releasing PHI related
summary information and search query results from
medical documents. Existing privacy-preserving
techniques for releasing structured data or PHIremoved data are not readily applicable to the problem.
(2) We propose a novel approach to release patients’
demographic and health information from medical
documents. The privacy preserving mechanism is
based on the leading-edge idea of differential privacy,
which offers rigorous privacy guarantee. (3) We
conduct an experimental study that demonstrates the
effectiveness of the proposed approach.
This paper is organized as follows. We review
related work in data privacy and health informatics in
Section 2. We then demonstrate in Section 3 the
privacy and data quality problem with the current Safe
Harbor practice, using an illustrative example. In
Section 4, we present the proposed approach for
summarizing medical documents and releasing search
query results with privacy guarantee. In Section 5, the
results of an experimental study are provided. We
conclude our paper and provide future research
directions in Section 6.

2. Related Work
In analyzing privacy disclosure risk, the literature
typically recognizes two types of disclosure [7]: (a)
identity disclosure (or re-identification), which occurs
when an adversary is able to match a record in a deidentified dataset to an actual individual; and (b)
attribute disclosure, which occurs when an adversary
is able to predict the sensitive value(s) of an individual
record, with or without knowing the identity of the

individual. Related to the two types of disclosures, the
attributes of data on individuals can be classified into
three types. We discuss them in the context of medical
and health data, with respect to the HIPAA-defined
PHI categories, as listed in Figure 1 (from pp. 8281882819 in [5]).
1. Names
2. Locations: All geographic subdivisions smaller
than a state, including street address, city,
county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent
geocodes, except for the initial 3 digits of a zip
code if the correspond area contains more than
20,000 people.
3. Dates: (i) All elements of dates (except year) for
dates directly related to an individual, including
birth date, admission date, discharge date, date
of death. (ii) All ages over 89 and all elements
of dates (including year) indicating such an age.
4. Telephone numbers
5. Fax numbers
6. E-mail addresses
7. Social security numbers
8. Medical record numbers
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers
10. Account numbers
11. Certificate/license numbers
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including
license plate numbers
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers
14. Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
15. Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
16. Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice
prints
17. Full face photographic images and any
comparable images
18. Any other unique identifying number,
characteristic, or code

Figure 1. Protected Health Information (PHI)
Defined by HIPAA
The first type is explicit identifier (EID), which are
PHI attributes that can be used to directly identify an
individual, such as name, phone number and email
address. It is clear from Figure 1 that all PHI categories
are EIDs except category 2 (locations) and category 3
(dates). HIPAA requires that EIDs be removed or
encrypted in the released data. The second type is
quasi-identifier (QID), which do not explicitly reveal
identities but may be linked to external data sources to
eventually identify an individual. QIDs include some
PHI attributes such as date of birth, admission date,
and zip code; they also include some non-PHI
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attributes such as age, gender and race. Sweeney [24]
found out that 87% of the population in the US can be
uniquely identified with three QID attributes – gender,
date of birth, and 5-digit zip code – which are
accessible from voter registration records available to
the public. The third type is sensitive attributes (SAs),
which contain private information that an individual
typically does not want disclosed, such as sexual
orientation and personal financial information. In the
context of health and medical data, SAs are health and
medical information (HMI) such as symptoms, test
results, diagnoses, diseases, medications and
procedures. None of the items listed in Figure 1 is
HMI. That is, HIPAA does not provide guidelines on
how to protect SA/HMI information; instead, the basic
idea of HIPAA Safe Harbor rule is to protect privacy
by preventing identity disclosure.
Most of data privacy studies assume that data is
stored in well-defined relational databases. A major
line of research has focused on devising principles to
establish the requirements of privacy protection and to
form criteria for assessing privacy risks. A well-known
principle is k-anonymity [24], which requires that each
individual record in a dataset should be
indistinguishable from at least k – 1 other records with
respect to the QID attribute values. The k-anonymity
approach focuses on re-identification risk only and
does not consider attribute-disclosure risk. To address
attribute disclosure, a privacy principle called ldiversity has been proposed [17]. The l-diversity
principle requires that an SA attribute should include at
least l well-represented values in the k-anonymized
data. Another privacy principle, called t-closeness [14],
addresses the issue by further considering the overall
distribution of the SA values. It requires that, for each
group, the distance between the distributions of the SA
values in the group and the overall distribution of the
SA values cannot be larger than a threshold value t.
The l-diversity and t-closeness principles typically
assume that there is a single SA attribute or several
pre-defined SA attributes, which is not a realistic
scenario for text data. Medical text documents
typically have a large number of unstructured (not predefined) SA/HMI attributes. It is essentially impossible
to apply the idea of l-diversity or t-closeness for
medical document data.
The k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-closeness
approaches all depend on some assumptions about the
adversary’s auxiliary information regarding individual
targets. When the assumptions do not hold, these
approaches may not work well [9]. To overcome this
limitation, Dwork [8][9] introduces the notion of
differential privacy. Intuitively, differential privacy
ensures that the released information about a dataset is
essentially the same whether or not an individual’s data

was included in the dataset. In other words, there is
virtually no additional privacy disclosure risk if the
individual opts in to the dataset. Differential privacy is
defined independent of any auxiliary information
assumption. Thus, it provides the most rigorous
privacy guarantee among existing approaches. On the
other hand, differential privacy requirements often
result in significant information loss in the released
data, which limits its applicability. A recent survey
found that application of differential privacy to the
medical and health domain remains an unexplored
research area [4].
Unlike privacy research in the structured data,
where numerous techniques have been proposed and
developed, privacy protection approaches for sharing
information in medical documents have mainly based
on the Safe Harbor principle, focusing on the detection
and removal of PHI items from the documents.
Meystre et al. [18] and Uzuner et al. [25] have
reviewed more than a dozen state-of-the-art techniques
in the field, all of which follow the Safe Harbor
approach and none takes statistical approach that is
common in the privacy research for structured data.
Thus, there is a lack of interaction between the
study in de-identification for medical documents and
that in anonymization for structured data. To integrate
these two research streams, existing de-identification
techniques need to be extended beyond the HIPAAdefined PHI fields. On the other hand, anonymization
techniques designed for structured data, such as
differential privacy, need to be adapted to take
advantage of the rich sematic information embedded in
the textual contents.

3. Privacy and Data Utility Problem with
Medical Documents
Given a collection of patient medical documents,
our first task is to extract relevant data elements and
assign them to the three categories described earlier:
EID, QID and HMI. This task involves information
extraction and classification. There exist many NLP
techniques in medical and health informatics to
perform this task [19]. We adopt some existing
techniques, to be described later, for this task. After
information extraction and classification, EID data will
be removed or encrypted, following the HIPAA rule.
The QID and HMI data will be stored in a semistructured scheme for query and analysis. In this
scheme, QID will be stored in a standard table, one
record for each document. HMI will be stored in a setvalued format, where each set of terms and values that
appear in a document is listed together and associated
with the QID values of the same document. Such a
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scheme is supported by many health information
systems that enable the use of EMR data for decision
support and health and medical research, such as the
i2b2 system [20] and the Vanderbilt research data
warehouse system [3]. Our work examines privacy
protection issues related to the search and release of
information from this scheme.
1. Visited on 4/5/2009. Male, 24 year old. Feeling
sore throat, fever, headache, fatigue…
2. Mr. Brown’s daughter is 9 year old. Visited on
4/13/2009…Having runny nose, sore throat,
fever, headache…
3. Admitted on 4-21-2009, patient is a 9 year old
female. Having runny nose, sore throat, diarrhea,
fever.
4. Amy is 17 year old. Having fever, joint pain,
nausea, sore throat…Visited 5/14/2009.
5. Admitted on 6/7/2009, the 88 year old man is
complaining chills, body pain, sore throat, fatigue,
fever…

Figure 2. An illustrative example of five
clinical notes

No.

1

2

3

4

5

Visit Visit
Age Gender
Month Year

April

April

April

May

June

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

24

9

9

17

88

Zip
Code

HMI

Male

sore throat,
fever,
12301
headache,
fatigue

Female

runny nose,
sore throat,
12301
fever,
headache
runny nose,
sore throat,
diarrhea,
fever

Female

12301

Female

fever,
joint pain,
12302
nausea, sore
throat

Male

chills,
body pain,
12302
sore throat,
fatigue, fever

Figure 3. Information extracted from the
example clinical notes
To describe the idea of our approach, consider a set
of five patient clinical notes shown in Figure 2, taken
from a hypothetical community hospital. Figure 3

illustrates the scheme that contains extracted QID and
HMI values. The first five columns follow a relational
database table format (where the additional Zip Code
data is obtained from the patient registration). The last
column contains a set of HMI terms/values. To comply
with the Safe Harbor rule, the hospital can only release
the data in Visit Year, Age, Gender and the first three
digits of Zip Code, as well as the HMI values.
However, this Safe-Harbor-based release can be overprotective. For example, because only the visit year
can be released, the important “season” information is
lost, which could be crucial for detecting an epidemic
disease outbreak. For the same reason, releasing the 3digit zip code (e.g., 123**), instead of the 5-digit zip
code, also causes significant information loss. On the
other hand, the Safe-Harbor-based release may be
inadequate for privacy protection. For example, it may
not be difficult to identify the 88-year-old man (No. 5)
in the region who has been hospitalized in 2009, using
publically available data.
The proposed mechanism releases information as
an output response to a search query using HMI terms.
We focus on count query using HMI search terms in
this early stage of our study. Even for the count query
output only, our approach can provide much more
useful information than the Safe Harbor rule. For
example, using the HMI search terms {sore throat,
fever}, the output can show a count for the following
conditions:
Visit Month = ‘April’,
Visit Year = 2009,
Age = 9,
Gender = ‘Female’,
Zip Code = 12301,
HMI = {sore throat, fever}.
Since there are two matching records in the example
set, the perturbed count will be 2 plus a noise (which
will be discussed in the next section). Without loss of
clarity, we write the above conditions as:
<April, 2009, 9, F, 12301, {sore throat, fever}>
We can also query with slightly different conditions,
<April, 2009, 12301, {sore throat, fever}>, which has
three matching records; so the perturbed count will be
3+noise. Moreover, we can also get a perturbed count
for <April~June, 2009, 1230*, {sore throat, fever}>,
which will be 5+noise. These outputs provide useful
information about a flu-like disease that may be
spreading in the area during the period (assuming
many similar records are found in the entire patient
database). Note that it is also possible for the proposed
mechanism to output the perturbed count for the
records with QID values matching those of record #5
(even though the match is unique), but the noise for the
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count is likely to be very large compared to the original
count.

4. Differentially Private Data Release
Our proposed method for adding noise is based on
the notion of differential privacy [8][9], which is
defined bellow:
Definition 1. Given any two datasets D1 and D2
that differ in only one record, a perturbation
mechanism M provides e-differential privacy if for any
set of possible outputs S of M (i.e., S ⊆ Range(M ) ),

Pr[ M ( D1 ) ∈ S ] ≤ e e × Pr[ M ( D2 ) ∈ S ] .

(1)

The parameter e represents disclosure risk, which is
usually controlled to be small so that ε ε is close to
one. As such, differential privacy guarantees, in a
probabilistic sense, that the outputs will be essentially
the same with or without any specific individual’s
participation. This property has a very appealing
implication. For example, if the dataset were to be used
by a healthcare provider to analyze the demographics
of its patient population, then the presence or absence
of a patient’s record in the dataset will not significantly
change the results of the analysis. In this sense, the
participating patient’s demographic information is well
hidden.
For a frequency query (e.g., query for count or
histogram), there is a straightforward way to construct
a perturbation mechanism that satisfies e-differential
privacy. The mechanism is based on the notion of
sensitivity defined below [8]:
Definition 2. For a function f over dataset D with
numeric output, the sensitivity of f is

Df = max f ( D1 ) − f ( D2 ) 1
D1 , D2

(2)

for all D1 , D2 differing in at most one record.
In other words, the sensitivity is the maximum
change in the value of f when any single record of D
changes. To add noise for a numeric output, it is
convenient to use a Laplace distribution. The Laplace
distribution with a scale parameter σ, Laplace(σ ) , has
a density function of p ( x | σ ) = (1 / 2σ )e −| x|/ σ . With
this distribution, we have the following result [9]:
Result 1. For a numeric function f, a perturbation
mechanism that adds noise with a Laplacε(∆f / ε )

distribution to the output satisfies e-differential
privacy.
To be rigorous, for an integer-valued output, a
geometric distribution (instead of the Laplace) should
be used for perturbation [12], but this subtle difference
is not considered important in the literature. When f
represents a count query, sensitivity ∆f = 1 since the
count can differ at most by one due to the addition or
removal of one record. Therefore, for a count query f,
the perturbation mechanism

M ( D) = f ( D) + Laplacε(1 / ε )

(3)

provides e-differential privacy.
Given a set of medical documents, our approach
first extracts EID-, QID-, and HMI-related terms.
There is no existing information extraction system that
can effectively extract all these terms. We have
adapted two open-source systems to perform this task:
the Stat De-id system [26] and the cTAKES system
[23]. Stat De-id treats capturing EID and QID terms as
a multi-class classification task and uses a support
vector machine (SVM) technique to classify a term as
an EID or QID category. The cTAKES system is a
natural language processing system specialized in
medical text domain. It combines rule-based and
machine learning techniques aiming at information
extraction from medical documents.
We do not use these two systems directly to extract
EID, QID, and HMI terms. Instead, we took the basic
classifier components from the two systems to build a
set of independent base classifiers (e.g., rule-based
classifier, SVM-based classifier, conditional random
field (CRF)-based classifier, etc.). These base
classifiers classify the terms in medical documents into
one of the four categories: EID, QID, HMI, or
OTHER. The results of the base classifiers are then fed
into an ensemble classifier to produce the final
combined result. For example, in the combined result
for record 2 in Figure 2, “Mr. Brown” will be classified
as an EID. Similarly, “9 year old” and “daughter”
(which implies female) will be recognized as QIDs.
Words such as “sore throat,” “fever,” and “fatigue,”
will be classified as HMI.
When there are conflicts between base classifiers,
the ensemble classifier resolves the conflicts based on
privacy priority. For example, an EID causes direct
disclosure of an individual’s identity and thus has the
highest privacy priority among the four categories. If a
term is recognized as an EID by any classifier, it will
be classified as an EID and removed from the text,
even though it is recognized as a QID or HMI by all
the other classifiers. As an example, if a base classifier
recognizes “White” as an EID (patient name) and the
other base classifiers consider it as a QID (race),
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“White” will be classified as an EID and removed from
the anonymized text. This enables maximum protection
for the EID attributes. Similarly, if a term is classified
as a QID by one classifier but as an HMI by the other
classifiers, it will be classified as a QID because a QID
value is subject to change (e.g., zip code 123**) while
an HMI value will remain unchanged in the
anonymized text.
After extraction, EID values are removed or
encrypted. The QID and HMI data are populated into a
scheme exemplified in Figure 3. Each row in the
scheme can be viewed as a transaction in the context of
association rule mining, and each value or term can be
viewed as an item. Therefore, the Apriori algorithm [2]
can be applied to find frequent itemsets. The minimum
support count for the frequent itemsets (i.e., the
number of transactions containing the itemsets) can be
considered as a privacy parameter (in addition to e).
This parameter can be controlled by the data owner but
unknown to the data user. It can be set to a relatively
small value because the count will be perturbed before
it is released.
1. For a set of medical documents, extract EID, QID
and HMI terms and values.
2. Remove or encrypt EID values. Load QID and HMI
values into a table D where the HMI field allows a
set of multiple terms or values.
3. Run the Apriori algorithm on D to find all frequent
itemsets that contain at least an HMI value.
4. For a count query f(D) involving a set of HMI value,
obtain the count result from the output of Step 3.
Perturb the result using Equation (3).

Figure 4. Computational Procedure
The entire computational procedure for our
proposed approach is summarized in Figure 4. In terms
of computational complexity, Steps 1, 2 and 3 can be
preprocessed, so the real time computation for a query
is very fast. Also, the Step 3 computation is faster than
that of the classical Apriori algorithm because the
itemset not containing any HMI term can be removed
immediately at each Apriori iteration. So, the
computation is efficient even if it is necessary to re-run
Step 3 (due to, for example, a change in the support
parameter).

5. Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the proposed approach and compare it
with the Safe Harbor approach, we have conducted an
experimental study using real patient document data.

The Informatics for Integrated Biology and the
Bedside (i2b2) project has obtained multiple sets of
medical documents from healthcare organizations and
made
them
available
for
research
(https://www.i2b2.org/NLP/DataSets). We used four of
the datasets for the experiment, all of which are
medical discharge summaries. The first set is related to
a clinical-text de-identification challenge competition.
The second set was initially used for evaluating
document classification techniques. The third set was
used for extraction of medication information from
clinical text. The fourth set was used for a challenge
competition to extract medical concepts, assertions and
relations. Because all of the datasets are medical
discharge summaries, the elements of information
contained in different datasets are similar, most
including patient name, admission and discharge date,
age, gender, hospital, symptoms, test result, diagnoses,
diseases, medications, and so on. Thus, we merged the
four sets into a single set, resulting in 2,867 text
records. After extracting the QID and HMI values from
the text, we found that there were very few zip code
and/or location values in the data that we could use for
the experiment. Therefore, we focused on the query
results involving the visit year and month data, which
appear in nearly all records. Recall that the Safe
Harbor rule prohibits releasing patient visit month data.
The privacy protection level is naturally measured
by the parameter e. Clearly, the smaller the e value, the
better the privacy protection the mechanism offers. In
terms of data utility, since the count query result can be
regarded as an itemset count, we use an itemset-related
measure in the literature [10][22], called relative error,
which is defined as

Relative Error =

n~i − ni
1
,
∑
| I | i∈I ni

(4)

where I represents the set of all frequent itemsets with
support count larger than the specified threshold value;
ni and n~i are respectively the original and perturbed
count of the ith frequent itemset. Since an itemset must
contain at least an HMI item, the relative error
measures the error rate for the results of the queries
having at least an HMI term while satisfying the
minimum support count requirement.
We set parameter e to five different values: 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, which are in general more
conservative (i.e., with stronger privacy protections)
than commonly used e values in differential privacy
research. To evaluate the performance at different
frequency levels, we set minimum support count to
five values: 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50. The results of the
perturbation algorithm vary slightly with different
random number seeds. Therefore, for each scenario the
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algorithm was run five times, each run using a different
seed. The average results are reported.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure
5. It is observed that the error rate decreases as the
privacy risk (e) increases, which is expected.
Furthermore, the error rate decreases as the support
count increases. This also makes sense because the
frequency count for the selected itemsets (the
denominator in Equation 4) becomes larger when the
support is increased. The added Laplace noise,
however, is independent of the support. When e is
small, its value is approximately the odds that the
output results will be different due to the addition or
removal of any record (e.g., when ε = 0.1 , the odds is
about e 0.1 − 1 = 0.105 ). Note that the results are based
on the queries that allow releasing visit month data,
which is prohibited in the HIPAA Safe Harbor rule.
Therefore, the proposed approach provides an
additional option to Safe Harbor for data release, based
on well-grounded assessment of disclosure risk. If the
data include other HIPAA-restricted QIDs such as zip
code, location, and date of birth, similar analyses can
be performed based on our approach.
Privacy
Parameter

Support Count
10

20

30

40

50

e = 0.5

0.149

0.078

0.056

0.042

0.034

e = 0.4

0.184

0.096

0.070

0.055

0.046

e = 0.3

0.246

0.132

0.095

0.074

0.060

e = 0.2

0.350

0.187

0.131

0.104

0.086

e = 0.1

0.731

0.394

0.288

0.223

0.177

Month
Estimated

0.510

0.433

0.436

0.461

0.436

Figure 5. Results of Relative Error
Because the problem we study is new to the
literature, there are no existing techniques that can be
compared directly. We have assumed a scenario where
the released output is Safe Harbor compliant (i.e.,
without month), but the data user attempts to estimate
the month value for the query output with a probability
proportional to the marginal distribution of the month
values. The month values in the dataset are distributed
unevenly, ranging from 4% for the least frequent
month to 13% for the most frequent month. The error
results under this Safe Harbor scenario are shown on
the last row of Figure 5 (labeled “Month Estimated”).
It is observed that the resulting error rates are in
general much higher than those from our approach,
particularly when the count becomes large. Therefore,
if the month information is important, it is worthwhile
to consider using the proposed approach. If the dataset

contains location data such as zip code, the proposed
approach can also be applied similarly to obtain count
results for location values at a more detailed level than
that allowed by Safe Harbor (e.g., 5-digit zip code
rather than the first 3 digits only).
Clearly, the proposed approach outperforms the
HIPA’s Safe Harbor rule in this experimental study.
Safe Harbor applies the same standard for deidentifying data, which expectedly causes underprotection for some data but over-protection for others
because disclosure risks in different data are different.
Recognizing this limitation, HIPAA also provides
guidelines that enable statistical assessment and control
of privacy disclosure risk. Our work follows this line
of approach in HIPAA. The proposed approach
integrates medical informatics techniques with
differential privacy, a statistical perturbation method.
This allows the user to have more flexibility in dealing
with different disclosure scenarios.

6. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this study, we investigate the privacy issues
related to summary and release of information from
patient medical documents. We propose a novel
approach to extract and release patients’ demographic,
health and medical data from medical documents. Our
approach is based on the well-grounded notion of
differential privacy, which offers rigorous privacy
guarantee. Our experiments show that the proposed
method outperforms the HIPAA Safe Harbor approach.
Therefore, the proposed approach may be a promising
alternative to Safe Harbor for releasing information
from medical document with appropriate privacy
protection.
Due to increasing applications of medical data
sharing in practice, there is a rising concern that patient
privacy is being compromised. The proposed approach
will reduce the disclosure risks of individuals from
anonymized data, while improving the utility of the
data. This should alleviate patients’ concerns about
loss of privacy and confidentiality and increase their
willingness to participate in research that uses patient
data. The proposed approach will also reduce
organizations’ concerns about potential privacy
violations and enable organizations to safely share and
publish high-quality data for legitimate research and
analysis.
One limitation of this study is that the proposed
approach was tested on only a relatively small dataset
for proof of concept. This dataset might not be an ideal
representation of various patient populations. It will be
more helpful if some larger datasets are used for
experimental evaluation. In order to compare the
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proposed approach with the Safe Harbor approach, the
PHI values in the original data need to be more
detailed than those restricted by Safe Harbor (e.g., date
of birth instead of year of birth, and 5-digit zip code
instead of 3-digit zip code). Due to data holder’s
privacy concern, it is very difficult to obtain data with
more detailed information than that allowed by Safe
Harbor. Future research will obtain more and larger
datasets to further validate the proposed approach.
Another limitation is that the proposed perturbation
mechanism only applies to query output, not to the
original data. It is well-known that output perturbation
is vulnerable to the same repeated query attack because
in this case the independently added noises will
eventually be averaged out, revealing the true value of
the query output. Consequently, protection provided by
noise perturbation will no longer be effective, causing
disclosure of individuals’ sensitive information. A
simple solution to this problem is to limit the number
of repeated query. Various other methods have also
been proposed to address this problem, but they all
cause considerable deterioration in output quality [9].
For our problem which deals with unstructured data,
however, it is possible to add noise in between the text
input and the query output. For example, the noise
addition may be performed in the information
extraction stage. Future research will investigate viable
approaches along this direction. It is also possible to
release the extracted data directly in a set-valued
format using differential privacy, but a fairly large
amount of noise may be required for such a direct
release. It appears that a relaxed notion of differential
privacy may be necessary for this task.
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